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INTRODUCTION
RICHARD W. WRIGHT, FLORENCE G’SELL AND SAMUEL FEREY*
Causation of the plaintiff’s injury by the wrongful aspect of the de-
fendant’s conduct is a basic requirement for the defendant’s liability for the 
injury in every legal system of which we are aware. However, elaboration 
of the concept of causation and its role in establishing and apportioning 
liability has until recently been infrequent in common law jurisdictions and 
continues to be rare in most civil law jurisdictions other than Germany. The 
articles in this symposium, which are also being published in French by 
Bruylant,1 are part of an effort to focus more attention on these issues from 
a comparative interdisciplinary perspective. The articles are based on pa-
pers presented at a conference organized by professors Samuel Ferey and 
Florence G’sell that took place in September 2014 before an audience of 
judges, academics and practicing lawyers in the Grand Chambre of the 
Cour de Cassation (the highest court in France for civil and criminal cases) 
and at the University of Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2), organized by the Bureau 
of Theoretical and Applied Economics and the François Gény Institute of 
the University of Lorraine and the Center for Law and Economics of the 
University of Panthéon-Assas. This conference was part of the Damage 
project supported by the French National Research Agency.2
The organizers of and participants in the Paris conference were espe-
cially appreciative of and honored by the agreement of the Premier Prési-
dent of the Cour de Cassation, Bertrand Louvel, to provide a welcoming 
speech to open the conference and to have it published in the conference 
proceedings.3 His speech included not only a gracious welcome but also 
extensive discussion of the concept of causation and its application by the 
* Samuel Ferey is a Professor of Economics at the University of Lorraine. Florence G’sell is a
Professor of Private Law at the University of Lorraine. Richard W. Wright is a University Distinguished 
Professor and Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. CAUSALITÉ, RESPONSABILITÉ ET CONTRIBUTION À LA DETTE (Samuel Ferey & Florence 
G’sell eds. and trans., 2016).
2. The organizers of the symposium acknowledge the financial support from the French Nation-
al Agency for Research (JCJC Damage program, ANR-12-JSH1-0001, 2012-2016). 
3. Bertrand Louvel, Opening Remarks—Welcome, in 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 457 (Andrea
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Cour de Cassation. Following Louvel’s welcoming speech, the articles in 
this symposium are divided into three groups, each containing three arti-
cles. The first group discusses the philosophical, legal and economic theo-
ries of causation. The second group discusses liability when there is 
inherent uncertainty regarding causation. The third group discusses appor-
tionment of liability among multiple legally responsible causes.
Much of the discussion of causation in law, philosophy and economics 
is clouded by a failure to recognize or distinguish the several quite different 
senses of necessity and sufficiency that are employed in causal analysis. In 
descending order of stringency, the strict necessity criterion requires for a 
condition X to be a cause of Y that X be necessary for the occurrence of Y 
whenever Y occurs (that is, in the absence of X, Y could never occur); the 
strong necessity criterion (described as the sine qua non or but for criterion 
in the law) requires only that X have been necessary for the occurrence of 
Y in the specific situation, considering all the other then existing condi-
tions; and the weak necessity criterion requires only that X have been nec-
essary for the sufficiency of a set of existing conditions that was sufficient 
for the occurrence of Y (the so-called NESS criterion). The strict sufficien-
cy criterion requires that X be sufficient by itself, without any other exist-
ing conditions, for the occurrence of Y (which is never true); the strong 
sufficiency criterion is the same as the weak necessity criterion; and the 
weak sufficiency criterion “requires” only that X be a part of some set of 
existing conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of Y (which will 
always be true no matter how causally irrelevant the condition actually is).
I. CAUSATION THEORIES
The first two articles in this group provide an overview of the current 
philosophical and economic theories of causation, in general and as applied 
in the law. In their article,4 Richard Wright and Ingeborg Puppe assert that 
considerable confusion has been generated in philosophy, law and econom-
ics by the use of causal language to refer not merely to causation in its 
basic (natural/actual/factual) sense, which focuses solely on the content and 
working out of the laws of nature, but also to the quite different normative 
issues of moral and legal responsibility. To reduce such confusion and en-
courage proper identification and analysis of the distinct causation and 
responsibility issues, they urge that, in the legal context at least, causal 
language should be used to refer solely to causation in its basic sense. They 
4. Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, Legal and 
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also argue, contrary to frequent statements in legal sources that the law 
need not and should not concern itself with the philosophical analysis of 
causation, that such analysis is essential for distinguishing and correctly 
analyzing causation in its basic sense. They criticize the strong necessity 
(sine qua non, but for) criterion, which is generally described in philoso-
phy, law and economics as the exclusive test of causation and applied 
through a counterfactual analysis, and the various attempts to modify it to 
enable it to resolve properly situations involving overdetermined causation.
They argue, instead, for increased recognition and application in such 
situations of the more comprehensive weak necessity/strong sufficiency, 
laws-of-nature-based, “covering law” account, as initially elaborated by 
John Stuart Mill and further developed in the modern legal literature as the 
“NESS” (necessary for the sufficiency of a sufficient set) criterion. They 
explain that the covering law account of causation underlies and incorpo-
rates the strong necessity criterion and the (also often referenced) inde-
pendent strong sufficiency criterion, each of which has limited 
applicability, while going beyond both to encompass all instances of causa-
tion. They argue that it alone is able to explain and justify the decisions of 
the courts, which currently rely on unexplained and unelaborated findings 
of causation in overdetermined causation situations.
Wright and Puppe rely on the covering law account to explain the 
proper evidential requirements for proof of general and specific causation. 
They argue that proof of causation in a specific instance should and usually 
does require the formation of a warranted belief, based on concrete evi-
dence specific to the particular instance, in the complete instantiation of the 
relevant covering laws in the specific instance. They criticize a common 
interpretation of the standard of persuasion for civil cases in some common 
law jurisdictions as merely requiring a 50+ percent statistical probability, 
and they note the confusion and paradoxes that result from the courts’ ap-
plying the statistical probability interpretation in certain situations involv-
ing inherent uncertainty regarding causation. They argue that, in those 
situations, the inherent uncertainty should be explicitly acknowledged and 
distinguished from the normative responsibility issue of whether some 
second-best just liability scheme should be adopted by, for example, re-
versing the burden of proof on causation or imposing liability proportional 
to the probability of causation.
Wright and Puppe conclude by explaining the basic inconsistency of 
the causation requirement for liability with the efficiency theories of liabil-
ity, which focus on efficient deterrence (creating ex ante incentives for 
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justly caused injuries. They note the recognition of this inconsistency by 
most efficiency theorists and the analytical and descriptive failure of some 
efficiency theorists’ attempts to fit the causation requirement into their 
theories.
In her article,5 Florence G’sell also notes that the term “causation” has 
different interpretations and usages depending on the relevant interests in 
the particular context, while also asserting that philosophy and law have a 
common interest in explaining how a specific situation came about and 
attributing legal responsibility for particular consequences. Focusing pri-
marily on the concept of causation in its basic explanatory sense, she also 
mentions the adequacy theory’s risk-based approach to assigning legal 
responsibility for actually caused harms, which also relies upon causal 
laws, although as a basis for prediction rather than explanation. She sum-
marizes the three main types of current theories of causation in philoso-
phy—the counterfactual strong necessity theories, the regularity and 
covering law theories, and the probabilistic theories—prior to discussing 
and briefly criticizing their extensions and applications in legal theory and 
practice.
G’sell notes that, among other difficulties, the counterfactual strong 
necessity theories are unable to handle properly situations involving over-
determined causation by duplicative or preemptive causes. She describes 
the weak necessity covering law theories as being more promising, general-
ly accepted by legal scholars in common law jurisdictions, and capable of 
explaining legal practice in civil as well as common law jurisdictions. 
However, she points out, there have been questions raised regarding the 
ability of covering law theories to handle indeterministic causal processes 
and Wright’s claim that a non-circular definition of causal laws has been or 
can be provided. She concludes that the ex ante probability theories pro-
moted by efficiency theorists are better suited for ex ante causal prediction 
than ex post causal explanation, and she observes that probabilistic analyses 
generally are not employed to define or determine causation in civil law 
jurisdictions, which instead tend to employ presumptions or reversals of the 
burden of proof or proportional liability for lost chances when causation is 
inherently uncertain.
In the third article in this group,6 Bruno Deffains, Claude Fluet and 
Maïva Ropaul focus solely on the economic theories of causation in the 
5. Florence G’sell, Causation, Counterfactuals and Probabilities in Philosophy and Legal 
Thinking, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 503 (2016) (this issue).
6. Bruno Deffains, Claude Fluet & Maïva Ropaul, Causation and Standard of Proof from an 
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law, while acknowledging that the causation requirement is much more 
easily explained by assuming that justice, rather than efficiency, is the pre-
sumed goal of the liability systems. They describe the explicit and implicit 
attempts by leading efficiency theorists to replace the ex post causation 
requirement with a focus on ex ante efficient risk creation, prior to pursuing 
the other major approach in the efficiency literature, which analyzes the 
ability of negligence and strict liability rules, with and without the causa-
tion requirement, to achieve efficient (social welfare maximizing) deter-
rence. They focus on unilateral precaution situations (in which only the 
conduct of the particular defendant has any effect on what happens), with 
the efficiency theorists’ usual assumptions that negligence is defined as 
inefficient conduct and that the strong necessity (sine qua non/but for) cri-
terion is the exclusive test of causation.7
Their results are similar to those previously reached by others. Assum-
ing, in addition to the previously mentioned assumptions, no risk aversion, 
perfect information by all potential parties and adjudicators and perfect 
enforcement of the liability rule, a negligence rule with or without a causa-
tion requirement will be efficient, while a strict liability rule will need the 
causation requirement and will not work if there is more than one potential 
defendant. Assuming limited liability and/or imperfect information regard-
ing the actual or efficient levels of care, efficient deterrence is enhanced, 
but not assured to be optimal, by abandoning the causation requirement.8
II. LIABILITY WHEN CAUSATION IS INHERENTLY UNCERTAIN
Courts today frequently encounter situations in which causation is in-
herently uncertain, due to lack of sufficient knowledge of the underlying 
causal laws (the “general causation” or “causal capacity” issue) and/or 
sufficient information about the circumstances in the specific situation (the 
“specific causation” issue). When general causation (the abstract ability of 
a type of condition to cause a type of injury under relevant causal laws) is 
not sufficiently proved, courts generally deny liability. When general cau-
sation has been sufficiently proved but it is inherently impossible to prove 
or disprove tortious causation by the defendant in the specific instance, 
7. For discussion of situations involving bilateral and multilateral contributors, including multi-
ple defendants as well as the plaintiff, with or without perfect information regarding the levels of care, 
see Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense 
of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1169–
79 (1988).
8. See id.; John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 
(1973); Richard W. Wright, The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability, 7 J. TORT L.
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courts in some circumstances have adopted second-best liability rules, in-
cluding presumptions or inferences of causation and full or proportionate 
liability based on a mere statistical probability (greater or less than 50 per-
cent) of causation, while sometimes erroneously claiming that specific 
causation has thereby actually been proven.9
In his article,10 Jean-Sébastien Borghetti focuses on a particular legal 
controversy in France that raises both issues, but especially the general 
causation issue. He observes that, although scientific studies have so far 
failed to establish (and indeed tend to disprove) that vaccination against 
hepatitis B can cause demyelinating diseases such as multiple sclerosis or 
the Guillain-Barré syndrome, and despite the fact that these adverse condi-
tions possibly can be caused by multiple other conditions, many cases have 
been brought in France by those suffering these adverse conditions after 
hepatitis B vaccination, against either the French government (due to com-
pulsory vaccination programs) and/or the manufacturers of the hepatitis B 
vaccine. The Cour de Cassation, which has jurisdiction over claims against 
private parties, initially denied compensation due to lack of proof of gen-
eral causation, while the Conseil d’État, which has jurisdiction over claims 
against the government, ruled that causation is established if the demye-
linating disease occurred within three months after the vaccination and no 
other cause could be identified. Subsequently, the Cour de Cassation decid-
ed to allow a presumption of causation on a case-to-case basis, considering 
all the facts in the specific case, including the timing of the onset of the 
disease, the absence of neurological history in the victim’s family, the lack 
of any other identified possible cause, and the intimate belief of the plain-
tiff’s doctor that the vaccination was the cause.
Borghetti acknowledges that a finding of specific causation may be 
proper when all other possible causes of the injury have been eliminated 
and there is some plausible scientific hypothesis about how the condition at 
issue could cause the injury. However, he notes, these conditions cannot be 
established in the hepatitis B vaccination cases. He sharply criticizes the 
Conseil d’État’s ruling that causation is established if the onset of the inju-
ry or illness occurred within three months when no scientific or other ra-
tionale was given or currently exists for specification of that time period or 
any other time period.11 He criticizes both courts for allowing a finding of 
9. See Wright & Puppe, supra note 4, at 489–94.
10. Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, Causation in Hepatitis B Vaccination Litigation in France: Break-
ing Through Scientific Uncertainty?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (2016) (this issue).
11. Cf. item VIII in the Vaccine Injury Table promulgated under the authority of section 312(b) 
of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–1, and section 2114(c) of the 
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causation in the absence of any scientific basis for such a finding. He calls 
for more attention to be paid by French courts and lawyers to distinguish-
ing and clarifying causal concepts, including the distinction between gen-
eral causation and specific causation, while noting that the failure of the 
courts to do so or to provide any rationale for their decisions enables the 
courts to change the law at will for policy reasons without explicit ac-
knowledgment that they are doing so. As a consequence, while it is often 
claimed that civil law courts merely deductively apply their country’s legal 
codes, the French courts are at least as active as any common law court, 
and likely more so, in making major changes in the law, sometimes contra-
ry to explicit language in the codes, but, unlike the common law courts, 
without any explanation or justification.
In her article,12 Lynda Collins argues that courts should be active and 
creative in relaxing the causation requirement for liability in toxic tort cases 
and other cases in which there is often inherent uncertainty regarding cau-
sation. She notes that scientific uncertainty regarding general and especial-
ly specific causation has frequently precluded recovery for plaintiffs even 
where defendants have negligently exposed them to toxic risk. She identi-
fies three major types of uncertainty: plaintiff indeterminacy (where we 
know that the defendant has tortiously harmed some proportion of a partic-
ular population but no individual can prove causation); defendant indeter-
minacy (where we know that one or more of a group of defendants has 
tortiously harmed a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs but it is impossible to 
identify which specific ones caused the harm); and indeterminacy of harm 
(where plaintiffs have been tortiously exposed to a risk that may or not 
have actually caused the harm).
Collins observes that, in Canada and most other countries, there is no 
recovery for mere tortious risk exposure unless it is proven to have caused 
measurable psychiatric or economic harm. The problem of plaintiff inde-
terminacy also remains unsolved, with a resulting under-deterrence of toxic 
harms and under-compensation of injured plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has, however, responded to the problem of defendant indetermina-
cy. Claiming that causation exists only if the strong necessity (sine qua 
non, but for) criterion is satisfied, the Court, in Clements v. Clements,13
http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/vaccineinjurytable.pdf, which sets forth the required time of 
onset of specified adverse consequences following administration of various vaccines for there to be 
presumed causation of and liability for the adverse consequence. The only listed adverse consequence 
for the Hepatitis B vaccine is “Anaphylaxis or anaphylactic shock” within four hours.
12. Lynda Collins, Material Contribution to Risk in the Canadian Law of Toxic Torts, 91 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 567 (2016) (this issue).
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adopted, on explicit policy grounds, a uniquely Canadian test for material 
contribution to risk as a replacement for proof of causation. However, the 
test apparently only applies in alternative causation cases, in which it is not
known which of several defendants caused the plaintiff’s injury. In overde-
termined causation cases, including Clements, in which it is known (using 
the weak necessity/strong sufficiency covering law criterion) which de-
fendants caused the plaintiff’s injury, the Court claims to employ the strong 
necessity criterion in a “robust” and “common sense” manner in order to 
find causation.14 Collins argues for expanded application of Clements’s 
“material contribution to risk” test to more types of situations, as well as 
expanded application of the battery action for exposure to toxic substances 
and reversing the burden of proof on causation upon proof of inadequate 
testing of a toxic substance.
In his article,15 Ken Oliphant reviews the range of judicial techniques 
that have been developed in common and civil law systems to address the 
issue of appropriate liability in situations involving inherent uncertainty 
regarding causation when there are alternative, rather than duplicative or 
cumulative, tortious causes. He notes that the development of these judicial 
techniques in each legal system has generally proceeded in an ad hoc and 
unprincipled fashion, without regard for overall coherence. He argues for a 
more principled approach in which the appropriate legal response (full 
liability, proportional liability or no liability) is adopted on the basis of a 
ranking of the different categories of cases in which the problem of inher-
ent causal uncertainty arises, based on the strength (or weakness) of the 
arguments in favor of the imposition of at least some liability.
Oliphant explains that the argument for liability of the defendant is 
stronger if it is certain that the defendant tortiously caused damage to 
someone, even if it is uncertain whether that someone was the claimant,
while being weaker but still significant if the defendant tortiously risked 
causation of damage but it is uncertain if this risk, rather than some inde-
pendent risk, eventuated in damage to someone. Conversely, the argument 
for recovery by the claimant is stronger if it is certain that she suffered 
tortiously caused damage, even if it is uncertain by whom it was caused, 
while being weaker but still significant if she was tortiously put at risk of 
suffering damage, but it is uncertain whether her damage eventuated from a 
tortiously created risk. The argument for liability is weakest where both 
tortious creation of the relevant risk and causation by a tortiously created 
14. Id. at 187–89, 192–96. 
15. Ken Oliphant, Causation in Cases of Evidential Uncertainty: Judicial Techniques and Fun-
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risk are uncertain. He applies these weighting factors to the various catego-
ries of inherently uncertain causation situations, with full liability being 
more appropriate when both the arguments for liability of the defendant 
and recovery by the plaintiff are strongest, no liability being more appro-
priate when both arguments are weakest, and proportionate liability being 
more appropriate when one of the arguments is strong but the other is 
weak.
III. APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY AMONG MULTIPLE RESPONSIBLE 
CAUSES
When there are multiple legally responsible causes of a specific injury, 
the issue arises as to how to apportion the liability among the multiple re-
sponsible causes, which may include a negligent plaintiff as well as one or 
more defendants. Under a “joint and several” (or “solidary”) liability rule, 
which is the general rule in almost all legal systems, the plaintiff can re-
cover the entirety of her damages, after proportionate reduction based on 
her percentage of comparative responsibility if she was contributorily neg-
ligent, from any one of the legally responsible defendants (tortfeasors). 
Any tortfeasor who pays the plaintiff can seek contribution from the other 
tortfeasors based on their respective percentages of comparative responsi-
bility for any payment to the plaintiff in excess of the paying tortfeasor’s 
percentage of comparative responsibility. Under a “several” or “propor-
tionate several liability” rule, which exists in many states in the United 
States for varying parts of the plaintiff’s damages due to so-called “tort 
reform,” the plaintiff may only recover from each tortfeasor a portion of 
her damages equal to that tortfeasor’s percentage of comparative responsi-
bility. Comparative responsibility is usually based on comparative fault, 
although it may also take into account relative causal contribution if that is 
measurable.16
In his article,17 Michael Faure reiterates the usual rules for apportion-
ment of liability (discussed in the prior paragraph) when there are known to 
be multiple responsible causes of a specific injury, as well as the common 
(but not universal, especially when there are very many potential tortious 
causes) imposition of joint and several (solidary) liability in alternative 
causation situations, in which it is not known which of several defendants 
who might have tortiously caused the injury actually caused all or part of it. 
16. See Wright, supra note 7, at 1141–46.
17. Michael Faure, Attribution of Liability: An Economic Analysis of Various Cases, 91 CHI.-
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He also discusses the suggestion by the European Group on Tort Law (a 
group of prominent tort law professors) that liability should only be propor-
tionately several in alternative causation cases.
Faure then focuses on the economic analysis of various apportionment 
rules from the perspective of efficient deterrence. Surveying the efficiency 
literature, he states that, for efficient deterrence when each tortfeasor is 
fully solvent, it is necessary that each tortfeasor either initially or ultimately 
be held liable only for a portion of the injury to which he contributed that is 
equal to his percentage of comparative responsibility, regardless of whether 
or not there is imperfect information regarding expected or actual causa-
tion. When there is insolvency, he argues that holding a tortfeasor liable for 
a share of the damages that exceeds the tortfeasor’s percentage of compara-
tive responsibility would result in the tortfeasor’s being liable for damages 
that he did not cause and would be inefficient.18
Faure discusses the history and incentive effects of the “channeling” 
(restriction) of liability to only one of several tortious causes of an injury, 
as occurs under some international conventions with respect to nuclear 
liability and marine pollution. He demonstrates that such channeling is 
inefficient unless the targeted person or entity can control the actions of 
and/or obtain reimbursement from the other actual or potential tortfeasors. 
Finally, Faure discusses vicarious liability, whereby one entity is held 
strictly liable for harm tortiously caused by another, for example, an em-
ployer for the harm negligently caused by his employee within the scope of 
the employment and, in many civil law systems, parents for the harm neg-
ligently caused by their children. Such vicarious liability will be efficient 
only if the entity held vicariously liable can control the actions of and/or 
obtain reimbursement from the actual tortfeasor.
In their article,19 Samuel Ferey and Pierre Dehez diverge from the 
economists’ usual focus on ex ante efficient deterrence and instead employ 
cooperative game theory to evaluate ex post the relative causal role of mul-
tiple tortfeasors in overdetermined causation situations, for the purpose of 
apportioning liability among the multiple tortfeasors. Recognizing the fail-
ure of the strong necessity (sine qua non, but for) criterion in such situa-
tions, they provide a typology of overdetermined causation situations that 
vary depending on whether the various tortious conditions were or were not 
(in some sense) necessary and/or sufficient conditions. Translating the usu-
al causal terminology into the language of game theory and employing the 
18. But see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
19. Samuel Ferey & Pierre Dehez, Overdetermined Causation Cases, Contribution and the 





      05/10/2016   13:13:34
37837-ckt_91-2 Sheet No. 14 Side A      05/10/2016   13:13:34
01 INTRODUCTION_ (DO NOT DELETE) 5/4/2016 1:12 PM
2016] INTRODUCTION 455
covering law theory’s conception of causes as consisting of minimally suf-
ficient sets of conditions, they treat each tortfeasor as a “player” in the 
“overdetermined causation game.”
Ferey and Dehez evaluate each tortfeasor’s contribution to the “grand 
coalition” consisting of all tortious contributors and each possible subset 
(“coalition”) of tortfeasors. The marginal contribution of a tortfeasor to a 
specific coalition is evaluated by asking whether the result would have 
been different, and if so to what extent, without that tortfeasor’s presence in 
the coalition, while also counterfactually assuming the non-existence of 
any tortfeasors excluded from the specific coalition but assuming the con-
tinued existence of all non-tortious conditions. The marginal contribution 
of each tortfeasor to each possible coalition is weighted according to the 
relative size of the coalition and taken into account in calculating the rela-
tive contribution of each tortfeasor to the actual legal injury, using a formu-
la that produces what is known as the “Shapley value.”
By taking into account each tortfeasor’s marginal contribution to all 
possible coalitions, rather than only the grand coalition, this approach, un-
like the strong necessity (sine qua non, but for) criterion but like the weak
necessity/strong sufficiency (NESS) criterion, is able to acknowledge caus-
al contribution in many overdetermined causation cases involving duplica-
tive (rather than preemptive) causation and, moreover, to go beyond the 
NESS criterion by providing a measure of relative causal contribution for 
the purpose of apportioning liability among multiple tortfeasors. It could 
easily be extended to include a contributorily negligent plaintiff as one of 
the players in the game.
In the final article in this symposium,20 Julien Jacob and Bruno Lovat 
propose an innovative approach to apportioning liability between an opera-
tor of some hazardous activity and the provider of technology employed by 
the operator, in order to provide optimal incentives for risk control by each, 
when neither the operator nor the technology provider (“innovator”) by 
itself has sufficient wealth to pay expected damages should harm occur but 
both together have sufficient wealth to do so. Under the traditional appor-
tionment rules, “joint and several” (“solidary”) liability and “(proportion-
ate) several” liability (which they call “non-joint” liability), liability is 
apportioned after the harm occurs based on an ex post assessment of the 
comparative fault and (perhaps) relative causal contribution of each party 
in the specific situation. Jacob and Lovat propose, instead, the calculation 
20. Julien Jacob & Bruno Lovat, Economic Analysis of Liability Apportionment Among Multiple 
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and promulgation, before any harm occurs and even before any interaction 
between or activity by the operator and the innovator, of a fixed portion of 
the damages to be allocated to each party should harm occur as a result of 
their subsequent interaction. The fixed share would be calculated using a 
formula that they develop which would take into account, among other 
factors, the available wealth of each party, the degree of competition in the 
market for the technology provided by the innovator, the respective costs of 
taking care or increasing successful innovation, and the effect on the prob-
ability of harm (but not its magnitude, which is assumed to be fixed) of 
their respective levels of care or degree of innovation. The prospective 
parties would then use this information to decide whether to interact and 
what level of care or degree of innovation to employ should they interact.
